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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
FROM A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE
,Q WKLVDUWLFOH ,DUJXHWKDWKLVWRULFDO LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWFRQFHSWVVXFKDVµSDWKGHSHQGHQF\¶ µFULWLFDO MXQFWXUHV¶
DQG µIHHGEDFNPHFKDQLVPV¶DUHYLWDO IRUH[SODLQLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJH)LUVW ,GHVFULEH WKHHPHUJHQFHRI
GLIIHUHQWµQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW¶DSSURDFKHVDVDUHDFWLRQDJDLQVWWKHGRPLQDWLRQRIEHKDYLRUDOLVPLQSROLWLFDO
science. Moreover, I show that new institutionalists transcend the limits of old institutionalism, as they in-
clude in the analysis both formal and informal institutions, and elaborate theories of institutional emergence 
and change. In the second section of the article, I discuss the main assumptions of historical institutionalism 
and its conception of institutional change. To grasp the distinctive character of the latter, I compare it with 
the conception of institutional change in rational choice institutionalism. 
Key words: institutional change, historical institutionalism, path dependency, critical junctures, feedback 
mechanisms
INTRODUCTION
Institutions re-emerged as part of the social science research agenda in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. In that period, an approximately 40-year-long domination of behavioralism 
within political science and political economy was challenged and academics again turned 
their attention to the role of political and economic institutions in structuring behavior of social 
actors and generating distinctive social, political and economic outcomes. However, as Peter 
Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996: 936) note, ‚new institutionalism’ in political science did 
QRWHPHUJHDVD³XQL¿HGERG\RIWKRXJKW´EXWLQFOXGHGDWOHDVWWKUHHGLVWLQFWLYHDQDO\WLFDO
approaches to the study of institutions: ”historical institutionalism”, ”rational choice institu-
tionalism” and ”sociological institutionalism”. These approaches differed, among others, in 
their conceptions of institutions, interpretations of relations between political institutions and 
behavior, and explanations of institutional emergence and change. 
In this article, I discuss historical institutionalism as a distinctive approach to the study of 
political institutions and institutional change in particular. First, I situate new institutionalism 
within a broad theoretical context including ”old institutionalism”, rational choice theory and 
behavioralism. I describe its emergence as a reaction against the prevalence of behavioral 
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analysis within political science. Moreover, I show that new institutionalists transcend the limits 
of old institutionalism, as they include in the analysis both formal and informal institutions, 
and elaborate theories of institutional emergence and change. In the second section of the ar-
ticle, I discuss the main assumptions of historical institutionalism, focusing on its conception 
of institutional change. 
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
7RXQGHUVWDQGWKHVSHFL¿FLW\RIQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLWLVQHFHVVDU\WRVLWXDWHLWLQUHODWLRQ
to a broad theoretical context including old institutionalism and dominant theoretical approach-
es within political science at the time of its emergence. It is now widely acknowledged that 
the turn towards institutions was a reaction against the behavioralism which dominated social 
sciences from the early 1950s to the late 1970s (Hall and Taylor 1996; Steinmo and Thelen 
1998), although some authors see it as also a response to the prevalence of rational choice 
theory in political science (Djelic 2010; Peters 1999). In fact, these approaches have similar 
assumptions about individuals and relations between individuals and political institutions, so 
it is possible to view them in terms of family resemblance. As Guy B. Peters (1999: 1) notes:
Both of these approaches assume that individuals act autonomously as individuals, based on either 
socio-psychological characteristics or on rational calculation of their personal utility. In either 
theory, individuals were not constrained by either formal or informal institutions, but would make 
their own choices; in both views preferences are exogenous to the political process. 
In short, behavioralism and rational choice theory share a commitment to methodologi-
cal individualism. 
However, before behavioralist and rational choice approaches became dominant, political 
scientists were concerned mainly with the role of formal political institutions in structuring 
behavior and generating distinctive political outcomes. So-called old institutionalism was 
a prevalent approach both within American and European political science from the late 19th 
century (emerging as a distinctive academic discipline at that time). Its primary object of analy-
sis was a relationship among formal institutions of government, law, and individual behavior. 
In particular, institutionalist analyses were focused on relations among formal institutions of 
government, their historical development and current political, cultural and socio-economic 
contexts, and relations between structures and human behaviour (Peters 1999: 3–11). Politi-
cal institutions were interpreted in this approach as the main determinants of the behavior 
of political actors and citizens. As W. Richard Scott (1995: 6) notes in a passage devoted to 
leading representatives of this current in American political science, such as John William 
Burgess, Westel Woodbury Willoughby and Thomas Woodrow Wilson, their work “involved 
painstaking historical examination of the origins, controversies, and compromises producing 
VSHFL¿FUHJLPHVVRPHDQDO\VHVZHUHH[SOLFLWO\FRPSDUDWLYHGHWDLOLQJKRZFHQWUDOSUREOHPV
or functions were variously managed by diverse governance mechanisms”. The main aim of 
old institutionalism, in turn, was to contribute to the development of ”good institutions” (it 
should not, therefore, come as a surprise that many political scientists at that time – including 
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Woodrow Wilson and Willoughby – were active politicians and civil servants). Finally, in 
FRQWUDVWWRQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWVZRUNLQJZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRIFRPSDUDWLYHSROLWLFDODQDO\VLVROG
institutionalists tended to compare whole political systems, which had its consequences in 
a limited capability to generalize and develop theory (ibid., 8–9). Early institutional analyses 
were, therefore, mainly descriptive.
The general orientation of political science changed radically with the advent of the ”be-
havioral revolution”, when interests of political scientists shifted from institutions towards 
observable attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of political actors: “behavioralists argued that, 
in order to understand politics and explain political outcomes, analysts should focus not on 
the formal attributes of government institutions but instead on informal distributions of power, 
attitudes, and political behavior” (Steinmo and Thelen 1998: 4). In contrast to old institu-
tionalism, this perspective was much more concerned with issues of theory-building, data 
collection and developing concepts which could be applied in a variety of disparate contexts. 
One example of such a perspective in comparative political analysis is structural functional-
ism: “this approach argued that all political systems must perform certain requisite functions 
and comparison therefore consisted of comparing which structures performed the tasks, and 
perhaps how well they were performed, in various countries” (Peters 1999: 12). However, 
focus on functions did not have a normative component as in the case of old institutional-
LVP±EHKDYLRUDOLVP UHMHFWHGQRUPDWLYLVP LQ IDYRXURIGHYHORSLQJD µYDOXHIUHH¶ VFLHQFH
Furthermore, instead of focusing on formal institutions of governments, administration and 
legal structures, it was predominantly concerned with ”inputs from society”: “what really 
mattered in this view of politics was voting, interest group activity, and even less legal forms 
RIDUWLFXODWLRQVZKLFKZHUHWKHQSURFHVVHGLQWRµRXWSXWV¶,QWKLVFRQFHSWLRQRIDSROLWLFDO
V\VWHPWKHIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVRIJRYHUQPHQWZHUHUHGXFHGWRWKHµEODFNER[¶ZKHUHWKHFRQ-
version of inputs into outputs occurred” (ibid., 14). However, it is not to say that during 
the period of domination of behavioralism political institutions and collective actors were not 
considered to be relevant objects of inquiry. They were still present within political analysis, 
but behavioralists reinterpreted them in individualistic terms. The form of political institu-
tions, their development and collective action were explained through reference to choices 
and characteristics of individuals. At the same time, questions of differences in political 
behaviors, attitudes and distribution of resources among contending groups across countries 
remained unanswered: “(...) interest group theories that focused on the characteristics and 
preferences of pressure groups themselves could not account for why interest groups with 
similar organizational characteristics (including measures of interest-group “strength”) and 
VLPLODUSUHIHUHQFHVFRXOGQRWDOZD\VLQÀXHQFHSROLF\LQWKHVDPHZD\RUWRWKHVDPHH[WHQW
in different national contexts” (Steinmo and Thelen 1998: 5). 
Behavioralism’s inability to account for neither diversity of behavior nor differences in 
political and economic outcomes was made evident during the economic crisis of the 1970s. 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s its dominant position within political science and political 
economy was challenged, individualistic assumptions of behavioralist perspective came under 
¿UHDQGSROLWLFDODQDO\VLVZDVDJDLQUHGLUHFWHGWRZDUGVTXHVWLRQVUHODWHGWRWKHQDWXUHRILQ-
stitutions and the role of institutional factors in political, economic and social life (ibid.). Out 
of the critique of behavioralism grew a number of distinctive approaches to political analysis, 
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ZKLFKZHUHJDWKHUHGWRJHWKHUXQGHUWKHXPEUHOODWHUPµQHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶1RWZLWKVWDQG-
LQJVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVDOORIWKHVHDSSURDFKHVVKDUHGDQXPEHURIFRPPRQFRQFHUQVDQG
general assumptions about political institutions and relations between institutions, politics and 
society. In opposition to behavioralists, who focused their analyses on general patterns and 
attempted to develop relatively universal concepts, new institutionalists underscored diversity 
within political, social and economic contexts. As an example, one can take the research of 
QHZLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVWVZRUNLQJZLWKLQWKH¿HOGRIFRPSDUDWLYHSROLWLFV$V6WHLQPRDQG7KHOHQ
(1999: 5) note, in contrast to academics associated with traditional interest-group theories and 
Marxist approaches “these theorists wanted to know why interest groups demanded different 
policies in different countries and why class interests were manifested differently cross-nation-
ally”. Thus, in order to explain such differences, new institutionalists refer to institutions, as 
they are supposed to structure the behavior and goals of individual and collective actors as well 
as distribution of power among them. As Peter Hall asserts, institutions include “the formal 
rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship 
between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall in: Steinmo and Thelen 
1999: 2). Institutions include, therefore, both formal and informal structures (including roles, 
norms and procedures) which are marked by relative stability over time and whose members 
share a set of basic values and goals (Peters 1999: 18–19; Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 4). 
New institutionalists assume, therefore, primacy of institutions over individuals and agree 
WKDWLQVWLWXWLRQVKDYHDFHUWDLQGHJUHHRIFDXVDOHI¿FDF\+RZHYHUWKH\GLIIHUWRDJUHDWHURU
OHVVHUH[WHQWLQWKHLUGH¿QLWLRQVRILQVWLWXWLRQVXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRILQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW
and change, explanations of emergence of institutions, and interpretations of the relation 
between individuals and institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999: 22). 
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
In general, the main focus of historical institutionalism in political science is the mediating 
role of institutional context in political struggles (Steinmo and Thelen 1998: 2). Peter Hall 
argues that this role manifests itself in two forms, as political institutions structure the rela-
tions of power and impact upon actors’ self-interpretations of interests: 
On the one hand, the organization of policy-making affects the degree of power that any one set 
RIDFWRUVKDVRYHUWKHSROLF\RXWFRPHV2QWKHRWKHUKDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOSRVLWLRQDOVRLQÀXHQFHV
DQ DFWRU¶V GH¿QLWLRQ RI KLV RZQ LQWHUHVWV E\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ KLV LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV DQG
relationship to other actors. In this way, organizational factors affect both the degree of pressure 
an actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely direction of that pressure (Hall in: Steinmo and 
Thelen 1998, 2–3).
Thus, in this view, the importance of institutions stems from their ability to structure 
political processes through shaping distribution of power and identities of political actors. 
With regard to the latter, Hall and Taylor (1996: 940) claim that historical institutionalists 
are divided between supporters of two approaches: ”calculus” (in which an actor’s identity is 
WUHDWHGDVGH¿QHGH[RJHQRXVO\DQGUHGXFHGWRXWLOLW\PD[LPDOL]DWLRQDQG´FXOWXUDO´ZKHUH
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LQVWLWXWLRQV SOD\ WKH UROH RI ³¿OWHUV IRU LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´ IRU DFWRUV0RUHRYHU DV *UHJRU\
Jackson (2010: 72) notes in his comment on developments within the studies of industrial 
relations, relations between institutions and identities should be interpreted in terms of “mutual 
interaction”, not as a unidirectional process:
(...) causal sequences do not only run from identity to interest to organization, but also vice-versa 
VRWKDWGLIIHUHQWLQVWLWXWLRQVLQÀXHQFHWKHVXFFHVVRIGLIIHUHQWIRUPVRIXQLRQRUJDQL]DWLRQDVZHOO
as perception of employee interests and even the socialization of employees into different identities.
Secondly, it is argued that the impact of institutions on policies and politics is not limited 
to a particular temporal context, but extends over long periods of time: “once governments 
make their initial policy and institutional choices in a policy area the patterns created will 
SHUVLVWXQOHVVWKHUHLVVRPHIRUFHVXI¿FLHQWWRRYHUFRPHWKHLQHUWLDFUHDWHGDWWKHLQFHSWLRQ
of the program” (Peters 1999: 65). This particular understanding of institutions can be traced 
back to the origins of historical institutionalism. As Hall and Taylor (1996: 937) assert, de-
spite the fact that it has developed in opposition to group theories of politics and structural 
IXQFWLRQDOLVPLWDOVRVKDUHVVRPHDI¿QLWLHVZLWKWKHVHDSSURDFKHV7KHWZRPRVWLPSRUWDQW
LQFOXGHWKHFRQWHQWLRQWKDWFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQJURXSVIRUUHVRXUFHVLVDWWKHFRUHRISROLWLFVDQG
that the latter has to interpreted in systemic terms. However, instead of focusing on similarities 
between different contexts, historical institutionalism underscores differences in institutional 
arrangements and national political outcomes. Moreover, it views the institutional organization 
of polity and political economy as the two main determinants of behavior and outcomes, rather 
than interpreting their operation in terms of disparate characteristics of individuals (ibid.). 
7KHVHDVVXPSWLRQVDQGDQDO\WLFDOVWUDWHJLHVDUHUHÀHFWHGDWWKHOHYHORIUHVHDUFKSUREOHPV
of historical institutionalist analyses which include, among others, the role of the state in 
VWUXFWXULQJJURXSFRQÀLFWDVZHOODVWKHUROHRIHPSOR\HURUJDQL]DWLRQVDQGWUDGHXQLRQVLQ
structuring interactions and generating distinctive political and economic outcomes (ibid., 938). 
Similarly, the structuring role of institutions is acknowledged by rational choice insti-
tutionalists, but it is interpreted in a different way. According to Peters (ibid., 44), within 
WKHUDWLRQDOFKRLFHYHUVLRQRILQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLQVWLWXWLRQVDUHGH¿QHG³DVFROOHFWLRQVRI
rules and incentives that establish the conditions for bounded rationality, and therefore establish 
DµSROLWLFDOVSDFH¶ZLWKLQZKLFKPDQ\LQWHUGHSHQGHQWSROLWLFDODFWRUVFDQIXQFWLRQ´,WVHHPV
therefore, that the importance of the structuring role of institutions is acknowledged, because 
they are interpreted as constraints on behavior of political actors (in fact, this is the primary 
focus of rational choice institutionalism, while questions of institutional emergence and change 
are given less attention). However, the role of institutions in shaping identities of political 
actors is neglected,as the latter are simply reduced to rational utility-maximizers.
If institutions are crucial in structuring political, economic and social life, then questions 
of institutional emergence and change become the most important problems for political 
analysis. Despite the common tendency to interpret institutions in relational and systemic 
terms, it seems that historical and rational choice institutionalist interpretations of institu-
tional change are incommensurable. The shape of historical institutionalist conception can be 
viewed as a consequence of interpretation of political institutions as phenomena which are 
embedded in particular temporal contexts. Thus Thelen (1999: 382) states that “[in historical 
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institutionalism – T.L.] the emphasis tends to be on political development as a (structured) 
SURFHVVDQGRQWKHZD\LQVWLWXWLRQVHPHUJHIURPSDUWLFXODUKLVWRULFDOFRQÀLFWVDQGFRQVWHOOD-
tions”. In contrast, rational choice institutionalism tends to describe and explain the emergence 
of institutions in functional terms, as the latter are viewed as coordinating mechanisms which 
originate from the need to sustain or establish systemic equilibria. As Terry Moe argues: 
“economic organizations and institutions are explained in the same way: they are structures 
WKDWHPHUJHDQGWDNHWKHVSHFL¿FIRUPWKH\GREHFDXVHWKH\VROYHFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQSUREOHPV
and thereby facilitate gains from trade” (Moe in: Peters 1999: 54). 
'LIIHUHQFHVLQGH¿QLWLRQVRILQVWLWXWLRQVLQKLVWRULFDODQGUDWLRQDOFKRLFHLQVWLWXWLRQVDUH
related to distinctive understandings of political and socio-economic systems in these two 
approaches. From a historical institutionalist perspective, systems are viewed as relatively 
FRPSOH[FRQWUDGLFWRU\DQGKHWHURJHQHRXVHQWLWLHVZKLFKDUHGULYHQE\JURXSFRQÀLFWDQG
tensions between different institutional arrangements. It stems from the fact that systems are 
constituted by institutions which have diverse temporal origins: “the various institutional 
arrangements that make up a polity emerge at different times and out of different historical 
FRQ¿JXUDWLRQV)RUWKLVUHDVRQWKHYDULRXVµSLHFHV¶GRQRWQHFHVVDULO\¿WWRJHWKHULQWRDFR-
herent, self-reinforcing, let alone functional, whole” (Thelen 1999: 382). This, in turn, results 
in a picture of political and economic realms, in which relations between different institu-
WLRQVDUHGULYHQE\FRQÀLFWVDQGWHQVLRQV7KHODWWHUPLJKWXOWLPDWHO\UHVXOWLQLQVWLWXWLRQDO
and, more generally, political change. Thus historical institutionalists view politics “(...) as 
a dynamic process that frequently produces unintended consequences as different, ongoing 
processes interact” (ibid., 384). Rational choice institutionalism, on the other hand, tends to 
IRFXVRQKRPRJHQHLW\DQGFRQVHQWZKLOHGRZQSOD\LQJWKHUROHRIFRQÀLFWDQGFRQWUDGLFWLRQV
EHWZHHQLQVWLWXWLRQV³LQVWLWXWLRQDOSROLWLFVDSSHDUVDVµQRUPDO¶DVSROLWLFVDVXVXDOH[SOLFLWO\
or implicitly opposed to an extraordinary politics, in which equilibria are upset, norms break 
down, and new institutions are generated” (Orren and Skowronek in Thelen 1999: 381). 
Here, institutional change is viewed as a succession of systemic equilibria, in which more 
³HIIHFWLYH´LQVWLWXWLRQVUHSODFHWKRVHLGHQWL¿HGDVG\VIXQFWLRQDOLQWKHSURFHVVRIVRFDOOHG
“competitive selection”), rather than a dynamic and ongoing process. As one example of such 
an approach, one can take transaction cost theory. According to Oliver Williamson (1981: 550), 
one of its founders, among the most important inspirations for the transaction cost approach 
was the Commons’ idea that new economic institutions arise in order to ”harmonize rela-
tions between parties” (or, in other words, reduce transaction costs and make every kind of 
H[FKDQJHPRUH HI¿FLHQW ,QVWLWXWLRQDO FKDQJH LV WKHUHIRUH LQWHUSUHWHGE\ UDWLRQDO FKRLFH
institutionalists in teleological terms. On the other hand, the work of Douglas North com-
SOH[L¿HVWKLVSLFWXUHDV1RUWKDQRWKHUDGYRFDWHRIUDWLRQDOFKRLFHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPSURYHV
that “new institutions may or may not emerge and, if they do, they may or may not be more 
HI¿FLHQW´&DPSEHOO
In their descriptions and explanations of the historical process and institutional change, 
historical institutionalists refer to three interrelated concepts: “path dependency”, “critical 
junctures” and “feedback effects”. The concept of “path dependency” is employed to describe 
and explain “the logic and self-reinforcing properties of particular national trajectories over 
time” (Thelen 1999: 388). According to Hall and Taylor (1996: 941), “path dependent” 
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understanding of history “rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will 
generate the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will 
be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past”. 
Within the historical institutionalist approach, political and economic institutions are identi-
¿HGDVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWFRPSRQHQWVRIWKLVFRQWH[WEHFDXVHWKH\DUHVXSSRVHGWRVWUXFWXUH
the subsequent policy choices and behavior of political and economic actors in different 
ways. As Hall and Taylor (ibid.) note, “past lines of policy condition subsequent policy by 
encouraging societal forces to organize along some lines rather than others, to adopt particular 
identities, or to develop interests in policies that are costly to shift”. Thus “path dependency” 
is used within historical institutionalism as a broad concept which captures the general logic 
of the political process. In contrast, rational choice institutionalists advocate less deterministic 
conception of politics and institutional change, in which institutions are described in instru-
mental and functional terms, as products of deliberate political strategies or, in other words, 
strategic interactions: “the process of institutional creation usually revolves around voluntary 
agreement by the relevant actors; and, if the institution is subject to a process of competitive 
VHOHFWLRQLWVXUYLYHVSULPDULO\EHFDXVHLWSURYLGHVPRUHEHQH¿WVWRWKHUHOHYDQWDFWRUVWKDQ
alternate institutional forms” (ibid., 945). Thus, although rational choice institutionalism ac-
knowledges that institutions constrain individual behaviour, it seems to implicitly assume that 
history is driven by rational individuals willing to pursue their goals. For example, Itai Sened 
proposes viewing institutions as constructions of individuals who want to “impose their will 
on others” and have “the capability to manipulate the political structure“ (Peters 1999: 55).
Apart from the conception of “path dependency”, historical institutionalists also invoke 
PRUHVSHFL¿FFRQFHSWVWRDFFRXQWIRULQVWLWXWLRQDOHPHUJHQFHUHSURGXFWLRQDQGFKDQJH7KHVH
include “critical junctures” which are understood as “crucial founding moments of institutional 
formation that send countries along broadly different developmental paths” (Thelen 1999: 
387). Thus, critical junctures are employed mainly to account for the emergence of particu-
lar institutions and diversity of outcomes in different political and social contexts which, as 
already indicated, is supposed to be an effect of political struggles, cleavages and crises as 
well as of interactions between different institutions and institutional domains. Cleavages 
and tensions between institutions are assumed to have major importance in politics, because 
they might lead into emergence of new actors and groups or reorganization of political rela-
tions, followed by critical junctures during which particular new institutional arrangements 
are developed and alternative possibilities are foreclosed (Collier and Collier 1991: 33). To 
explain how these new institutional arrangements are later reproduced, historical institu-
tionalists employ the concept of “feedback effect”. According to Thelen, two broad types 
of feedback mechanisms which support the reproduction of institutional arrangements can 
EHLGHQWL¿HG)XQFWLRQDOLVPPHFKDQLVPVSRLQW WRWKHVHOIUHLQIRUFLQJORJLFRILQVWLWXWLRQV
³RQFHDVHWRILQVWLWXWLRQVLVLQSODFHDFWRUVDGDSWWKHLUVWUDWHJLHVLQZD\VWKDWUHÀHFWEXWDOVR
UHLQIRUFHWKHµORJLF¶RIWKHV\VWHP´7KHOHQ7KH\DUHWKXVUHLQIRUFLQJSDUWLFXODU
institutions and whole political and socio-economic systems through structuring the behavior 
and strategies of political and economic actors. The second feedback mechanism is related to 
distributional effects of institutions, questions of power and political mobilization: “political 
arrangements and policy feedbacks actively facilitate the organization and empowerment 
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of certain groups while actively disarticulating and marginalizing others” (ibid., 394). For 
example, in Shaping the Political Arena, Collier and Collier (1991) describe and explain 
the evolution of the 20th century politics in Latin America in terms of changing relations 
EHWZHHQWKHVWDWHDQGWKHODERXUPRYHPHQW$FFRUGLQJWRWKHPFRQÀLFWVEHWZHHQZRUNHUV
and owners as well as between workers and the state in the late 19th century led ultimately 
into the “incorporation of the labour movement”. The latter process constituted a critical 
juncture which took diverse forms in Latin American countries and resulted in distinctive 
IRUPVRIQDWLRQDOSROLWLFVLELG±7KXVSROLWLFDOFRQÀLFWVDQGEURDGKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[W
are seen in this perspective as primary determinants of the political process and institutional 
change in particular. As opposed to this approach, rational choice institutionalists either take 
institutions as givens and focus on their impact (the idea of “exogenous institutions”) or view 
their construction in intentional terms. Thus, as Djelic (2010: 29) argues, “rational-choice 
QHRLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLQWHUSUHWVLQVWLWXWLRQVDVµKXPDQO\GHYLVHG¶UXOHVRIWKHJDPHWKDWUHÀHFW
and reveal human agency, intentionality, and rationality” (although she also underlines that in 
contrast to neo-classical economics, rational choice institutionalism acknowledges bounded 
rationality of actors and context-dependency of their actions). 
CONCLUSION
The main aim of this article was to examine a historical institutionalist account of insti-
WXWLRQDOFKDQJH$V,VKRZHGLQWKH¿UVWVHFWLRQRIWKHDUWLFOHWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHDQGRWKHUQHZ
institutionalist approaches developed as a reaction against behavioralism. The latter redirected 
political analysis in the post-war period towards questions of observable attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviors of political actors, while neglecting the problem of diversity of political outcomes 
and the question of the relation between broader political context and behavior. These issues, in 
turn, were to become crucial for scholars associated with new institutionalism, which emerged 
in the late 1970s. However, new institutionalism was not a monolithic tradition – scholars 
associated with it differed in their conceptions of institutions and institutional change, among 
others. Thus, in the second section of the essay, I looked at historical institutionalism as one 
way of studying institutions and institutional change in particular. As I was trying to argue, 
historical institutionalism provides a persuasive account of institutional change, founded on 
WKHDUJXPHQW WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDQJH LVDQRQJRLQJSURFHVVZKLFK LVGULYHQE\FRQÀLFWV
among different institutions, among institutional domains, and among political actors. From 
WKLVSRLQWRIYLHZLGHQWLW\RILQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSROLWLFDODFWRUVLVDUHVXOWRISROLWLFDOFRQÀLFWV
and struggles. In contrast, rational choice institutionalism provides a functionalist and inten-
tional account of institutional change, in which institutional change is viewed as a product 
of deliberate political strategies. This idea is highly problematic, as actors can, and in fact 
GRRIWHQKROGFRQÀLFWLQJSUHIHUHQFHVWKH\DUHQRWFOHDUDERXWZKLFKJRDOVWRPD[LPL]HDQG
what are the best ways to pursue their goals (Steinmo and Thelen 1998: 21). Moreover, it 
suffers from problems that are characteristic for all forms of functionalism, which were so 
ZHOOGHVFULEHGE\-RQ(OVWHU0RUHVSHFL¿FDOO\LWLVQRWDEOHWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHHPHUJHQFH
and development of particular forms of social phenomena.
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